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AI Security in the CI/CD Pipeline - Overview
Artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming how software is designed, developed, tested, deployed, and maintained. AI coding assistants generate application code, autonomous agents modify repositories and dependencies, and AI models are increasingly integrated into production applications. While these capabilities accelerate software delivery, they introduce new cybersecurity risks that traditional CI/CD security practices may not fully address. These include vulnerable AI-generated code, excessive agent permissions, prompt injection, compromised AI models, sensitive information exposure, and unauthorized automated actions.
Securing AI requires extending established DevSecOps practices to address both software developed using AI and AI-powered applications deployed into production. AI-generated code must be validated, autonomous agents must operate within controlled security boundaries, AI models and dependencies must be verified, and deployed AI applications must be continuously monitored for emerging threats. For DevOps and platform engineering teams, AI security reinforces the need to integrate cybersecurity controls across the entire CI/CD lifecycle—from Code and Prebuild through Build and Deploy to Post Deployment—while maintaining security evidence, traceability, and appropriate human oversight.
The following frameworks provide guidance relevant to AI security activities.
| Framework |
Relevant Guidance |
| NIST SP 800-218 – Secure Software Development Framework |
Secure development practices, software protection, vulnerability prevention, and secure development environments. |
| NIST SP 800-218A – AI SSDF Profile |
AI-specific considerations extending secure software development practices. |
| NIST AI Risk Management Framework |
AI risk identification, governance, measurement, and management. |
| OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications |
AI application risks including prompt injection, sensitive information disclosure, supply chain vulnerabilities, and excessive agency. |
| OpenSSF |
Open-source software supply chain security, project integrity, and secure development practices. |
These references provide security guidance for AI-assisted development and AI applications. They do not all establish mandatory compliance requirements.
This guide maps AI security activities to three primary phases of the CI/CD pipeline, identifying practical security controls and open-source tooling that can support their implementation. These phases are:
1 - Code and Prebuild
Securing AI-assisted software development, autonomous agents, AI models, and application design before entering the CI/CD pipeline.
Securing AI-Assisted Development and AI Application Design
Artificial intelligence is changing how software is designed and developed. AI coding assistants generate application code, autonomous agents modify repositories and dependencies, and AI models are increasingly incorporated into software applications. While these capabilities accelerate development, they introduce security risks that traditional development practices may not fully address.
Phase 1: Code and Prebuild focuses on establishing security controls before code, AI models, prompts, datasets, or autonomous agents enter the CI/CD delivery pipeline.
This phase extends established secure development practices to address AI-generated code, agent permissions, AI application threat modeling, model and data supply chain security, and the protection of AI configurations.
The objective is to identify and reduce security risks early in the software development lifecycle, before vulnerabilities or unsafe configurations are introduced into build and deployment processes.
Code and Prebuild Outcomes
By implementing these practices, development teams establish a security foundation for AI-assisted software development and AI application design.
Expected outcomes include:
- AI-generated code is subject to established secure development practices.
- Autonomous development agents operate with controlled identities and permissions.
- AI-specific application threats are identified before implementation.
- AI models, datasets, and dependencies are evaluated for security and provenance.
- Prompts, agent instructions, and configurations are protected through version control and review.
- Security requirements are documented for validation during build and deployment.
These outcomes prepare development artifacts for the automated security validation activities described in Phase 2: Build and Deploy.
Why AI Security Begins Before the Build
Traditional secure development practices focus on source code quality, dependency management, secrets protection, and secure application design. AI-assisted development introduces additional considerations. This phase will cover:
1.1 - AI-Assisted Code Development
Securing AI-generated code through secure development practices, automated security scanning, dependency validation, and human review.
AI-Assisted Code Development - Code and Prebuild
Securing AI-Generated Code During Software Development
Artificial intelligence is increasingly used to generate application code, recommend dependencies, create configuration files, and automate software development tasks. While AI-assisted development can accelerate delivery, generated code may introduce security vulnerabilities, insecure coding patterns, outdated dependencies, exposed credentials, or licensing concerns.
During Code and Prebuild, organizations should apply established secure development practices to all AI-generated code and changes. AI coding assistants and autonomous development agents should operate within defined security boundaries, and their output should be subject to the same security requirements as human-written code.
This activity focuses on identifying and preventing security vulnerabilities before AI-generated changes enter trusted source code repositories or proceed through the CI/CD build pipeline.
The following activities map NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF), the AI SSDF Profile (NIST SP 800-218A), and OWASP security guidance to actionable CI/CD practices and suggested open-source tools. The tools are illustrative and are not mandated by these frameworks.
AI-Assisted Code Development
Objective: Ensure AI-generated code is reviewed, tested, and validated for security vulnerabilities, unsafe dependencies, exposed secrets, and licensing risks before being incorporated into the software delivery pipeline.
The NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) establishes secure coding, code review, vulnerability analysis, and software verification practices that apply to both human-written and AI-generated software.
NIST SP 800-218A, the AI SSDF Profile, extends these practices to address additional security considerations associated with AI development.
AI-generated code should not be treated as inherently secure or trusted simply because it was produced by an automated system. Development teams remain responsible for verifying that generated code meets their security requirements.
For DevOps teams, AI-generated changes should be incorporated into existing source code management, peer review, static analysis, dependency scanning, and vulnerability management workflows. Automated security checks should identify potential weaknesses before code is merged, while policies should prevent AI agents from bypassing required reviews or security gates.
Particular attention should be given to generated dependencies, insecure API usage, authentication and authorization logic, secrets handling, and changes to security-sensitive configurations.
AI-assisted development should accelerate coding activities without weakening established secure software development controls.
| Framework Reference |
Security Activity |
CI/CD Implementation |
Suggested Open-Source Tools |
| NIST SSDF PW.5 |
Secure coding practices |
Apply secure coding standards to AI-generated code and identify insecure coding patterns before changes are accepted. |
Semgrep, Bandit |
| NIST SSDF PW.7 |
Code review and analysis |
Require peer review and automated security analysis of AI-generated code before merging changes into protected branches. |
Semgrep, SonarQube Community Build |
| NIST SSDF PW.8 |
Security testing |
Execute automated security tests and validate generated functionality against defined security requirements. |
OWASP ZAP, pytest |
| NIST SSDF PW.4, PW.7 |
Third-party dependency review |
Identify newly introduced dependencies, scan for known vulnerabilities, and review unapproved or outdated packages. |
OSV-Scanner, Trivy |
| NIST SSDF PW.5, PW.7 |
Secrets detection |
Detect hardcoded credentials, API keys, tokens, and sensitive information introduced by AI-generated code or configurations. |
Gitleaks, detect-secrets |
| NIST SSDF PO.1, PO.4 |
Development security policies |
Establish policies requiring security review, approval, and validation of AI-generated changes before integration. |
Open Policy Agent, Conftest |
| NIST SSDF PS.3 |
Software component inventory |
Track dependencies introduced by AI-generated code and maintain component records for vulnerability analysis. |
Syft, CycloneDX |
| NIST SSDF PW.4 |
Licensing and dependency due diligence |
Review third-party packages and license obligations associated with generated code and newly introduced dependencies. |
ScanCode Toolkit, ORT |
| NIST SP 800-218A; NIST SSDF PO.3, PW.7 |
AI development accountability |
Define responsibility for AI-generated changes and ensure automated contributions remain subject to established repository review and authorization policies. |
Open Policy Agent, Semgrep |
Framework references identify relevant security practices. Tool selection and implementation depend on the organization’s development environment and security requirements.
Expected Security Evidence
- Documented secure coding requirements applicable to AI-generated code.
- Records of code reviews and approvals for AI-generated changes.
- Static application security testing results.
- Dependency vulnerability scanning reports.
- Secrets detection results and remediation records.
- Automated test execution and validation results.
- Software component inventories identifying introduced dependencies.
- License analysis reports for applicable third-party software.
- Records of security policy enforcement and rejected changes.
- Traceable pull requests linking generated changes to review and validation outcomes.
These artifacts provide evidence that AI-assisted development follows established secure software development practices and that generated code is evaluated before entering the build and deployment process.
Security findings identified during Phase 1 should be resolved or appropriately documented before the affected changes proceed to Phase 2: Build and Deploy.
Additional Resources
1.2 - AI Agent Identity and Permissions
Securing autonomous AI development agents through identity management, least-privilege access, credential protection, and authorization controls.
AI Agent Identity and Permissions - Phase 1: Code and Prebuild
Artificial intelligence agents are increasingly used to generate code, modify repositories, update dependencies, execute commands, and automate software development activities. Unlike traditional coding assistants, autonomous agents may perform actions directly within development environments and interact with external tools and services.
These capabilities introduce security risks when agents are granted excessive permissions, unrestricted tool access, or credentials that provide access to sensitive resources.
During Code and Prebuild, organizations should establish identity, authentication, authorization, and access control requirements for AI agents before they are integrated into development workflows.
This phase focuses on preventing unauthorized agent activity, protecting credentials, and ensuring that AI agents operate within explicitly defined security boundaries.
The following activities map NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) practices and OWASP AI security guidance to actionable CI/CD practices and suggested open-source tools. The tools are illustrative and are not mandated by these frameworks.
AI Agent Identity and Permissions
Objective: Ensure autonomous AI agents operate with verified identities, least-privilege permissions, controlled access to development resources, and appropriate authorization for security-sensitive actions.
The NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) emphasizes protecting development environments, securing software development processes, and preventing unauthorized changes to software artifacts.
The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications identifies excessive agency as a risk when AI systems are granted unnecessary functionality, permissions, or autonomy.
For DevOps teams, AI agent access should be treated similarly to other automated service identities. Agents should use dedicated identities where supported, receive only the permissions required for their assigned tasks, and operate within controlled execution environments.
Agent-generated instructions should never replace independent access control decisions. Permissions must be enforced by repository platforms, identity services, execution environments, and other trusted systems.
| Framework Reference |
Security Activity |
CI/CD Implementation |
Suggested Open-Source Tools |
| NIST SSDF PO.2, PO.5 |
Agent identity management |
Assign controlled identities to development agents and establish authentication requirements for accessing repositories, tools, and services. |
Keycloak, SPIRE |
| NIST SSDF PO.5; OWASP LLM06 |
Least-privilege access |
Restrict agent permissions to approved repositories, APIs, directories, and development resources. |
Open Policy Agent, Casbin |
| NIST SSDF PO.5, PS.1 |
Credential and secrets protection |
Prevent agents from accessing unnecessary credentials and use controlled secret distribution mechanisms. |
SOPS, External Secrets Operator |
| OWASP LLM06 |
Tool authorization |
Restrict which tools, commands, and external services agents may invoke; enforce authorization independently of model-generated instructions. |
Open Policy Agent, Conftest |
| NIST SSDF PO.5; OWASP LLM06 |
Agent execution isolation |
Execute agents within restricted containers or sandboxed development environments. |
Podman, gVisor |
| NIST SSDF PS.1, PS.2 |
Change authorization |
Require review and approval for security-sensitive repository modifications and prevent agents from bypassing protected development workflows. |
Gitea, Open Policy Agent |
| NIST SSDF PO.3; OWASP LLM06 |
Agent activity auditing |
Record agent actions, tool execution, authentication events, and changes to development artifacts. |
OpenTelemetry, Falco |
Framework references identify relevant security practices and risk categories. Specific agent access controls are implementation recommendations rather than requirements explicitly prescribed for agents by every referenced framework.
Expected Security Evidence
- Documented AI agent identities and assigned responsibilities.
- Defined access control policies for repositories, tools, and services.
- Records demonstrating least-privilege permissions.
- Credential management and secrets protection configurations.
- Approved agent tool and command allowlists.
- Security policies for agent execution environments.
- Records of required reviews and approvals for agent-generated changes.
- Agent activity logs and security-relevant execution records.
- Evidence of authentication and authorization policy enforcement.
These artifacts provide evidence that autonomous AI agents are operating within controlled security boundaries and that development teams retain accountability for agent-initiated actions.
Agent security requirements established during Phase 1 should be validated during Phase 2: Build and Deploy and monitored throughout Phase 3: Post Deploy.
Additional Resources
1.3 - AI Application Threat Modeling
Identifying AI application security risks including prompt injection, excessive agency, data exposure, insecure tool integrations, and trust boundary violations.
AI Application Threat Modeling - Phase 1: Code and Prebuild
Artificial intelligence applications introduce security risks that extend beyond those found in traditional software architectures. Applications incorporating large language models (LLMs), retrieval-augmented generation (RAG), autonomous agents, external data sources, and tool integrations create new attack surfaces and trust relationships.
These systems may process untrusted prompts, retrieve external content, invoke privileged tools, and generate outputs that influence application behavior.
During Code and Prebuild, organizations should perform AI-specific threat modeling to identify potential vulnerabilities before application components are implemented or integrated into the CI/CD pipeline.
This phase focuses on identifying attack paths, evaluating security boundaries, and establishing controls to prevent unauthorized model behavior, sensitive information disclosure, and unsafe agent actions.
The following activities map NIST security guidance and OWASP AI risk categories to actionable threat modeling practices and suggested open-source tools.
AI Application Threat Modeling
Objective: Identify and document AI-specific attack surfaces, trust boundaries, potential threats, and appropriate security controls before developing or deploying AI-enabled applications.
The NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) emphasizes integrating security requirements and risk analysis into software design and development activities.
The NIST AI Risk Management Framework provides guidance for identifying, measuring, and managing risks associated with AI systems.
The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications identifies risks including prompt injection, sensitive information disclosure, supply chain vulnerabilities, improper output handling, and excessive agency.
For DevOps teams, threat modeling should be integrated into application architecture reviews, development planning, and security requirements definition.
AI components should be evaluated as part of the complete application architecture rather than as isolated models.
Threat models should identify how users, models, agents, retrieved information, and external services interact and where trust boundaries must be enforced.
| Framework Reference |
Security Activity |
CI/CD Implementation |
Suggested Open-Source Tools |
| NIST SSDF PW.1, PW.2 |
AI application threat modeling |
Create architectural threat models identifying AI components, external services, data flows, and security boundaries. |
OWASP Threat Dragon, OWASP pytm |
| OWASP LLM01 |
Prompt injection risk assessment |
Identify direct and indirect prompt injection paths through user input, retrieved documents, tool results, and external content. |
OWASP Threat Dragon, Promptfoo |
| OWASP LLM06 |
Excessive agency assessment |
Identify tools and actions that could allow AI agents to exceed authorized permissions or perform unsafe operations. |
OWASP Threat Dragon, Open Policy Agent |
| OWASP LLM02 |
Sensitive information exposure |
Document sensitive data flows and identify potential disclosure through prompts, model outputs, logs, and external integrations. |
Microsoft Presidio, OWASP Threat Dragon |
| OWASP LLM05 |
Unsafe output handling |
Identify where model-generated output is executed, rendered, parsed, or passed to downstream systems without sufficient validation. |
OWASP pytm, Semgrep |
| OWASP LLM08 |
Retrieval and vector security |
Assess unauthorized retrieval, malicious content injection, access control weaknesses, and exposure through vector databases. |
OWASP Threat Dragon, Garak |
| NIST AI RMF MAP, MEASURE |
AI risk assessment |
Evaluate likelihood, potential impact, system context, and appropriate mitigations for identified AI threats. |
OWASP Threat Dragon, DefectDojo |
| NIST SSDF PW.1, PW.2 |
Security requirements definition |
Convert identified threats into design requirements, acceptance criteria, and security testing tasks. |
OWASP pytm, Open Policy Agent |
Threat modeling tools support risk identification and documentation. Testing tools such as Promptfoo and Garak can help validate selected threats but do not replace architectural threat modeling.
Expected Security Evidence
- Documented AI application threat models.
- Architecture diagrams identifying AI components and external services.
- Data flow diagrams showing model inputs, outputs, and tool interactions.
- Identified trust boundaries and security-sensitive integration points.
- Prompt injection and agent misuse risk assessments.
- Sensitive information exposure assessments.
- Documented AI security risks and assigned risk owners.
- Security requirements and mitigation plans derived from identified threats.
- Records of architecture reviews and threat model updates.
These artifacts provide evidence that AI-specific security risks were considered during application planning and design.
Threat models developed during Phase 1 should inform the automated AI security testing and release validation activities performed during Phase 2: Build and Deploy.
Additional Resources
1.4 - AI Model and Data Supply Chain
Securing AI model provenance, training datasets, third-party dependencies, licensing, and AI software supply chain integrity.
AI Model and Data Supply Chain - Phase 1: Code and Prebuild
AI-enabled applications increasingly depend on externally sourced models, training datasets, machine learning frameworks, model repositories, and third-party software components.
These dependencies introduce security risks beyond traditional software package management. AI models may originate from untrusted sources, datasets may contain malicious or manipulated content, and model files may include unsafe serialization formats or dependencies.
During Code and Prebuild, organizations should establish processes for evaluating the provenance, integrity, licensing, and security of AI models and data before incorporating them into applications.
This phase focuses on identifying supply chain risks early, maintaining visibility into AI dependencies, and establishing trusted sources for AI components.
The following activities map NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF), the AI SSDF Profile, and OWASP AI security guidance to actionable CI/CD practices and suggested open-source tools.
AI Model and Data Supply Chain
Objective: Ensure AI models, datasets, frameworks, and third-party dependencies are evaluated for provenance, integrity, vulnerabilities, licensing, and supply chain risks before entering the software delivery pipeline.
The NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) establishes practices for identifying, evaluating, and securing third-party software components.
The NIST AI SSDF Profile (SP 800-218A) extends secure development guidance to address additional security considerations associated with AI model development and integration.
The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications identifies AI supply chain vulnerabilities and data and model poisoning as significant risks.
For DevOps teams, AI model and data dependencies should be evaluated before being introduced into trusted development environments.
This includes verifying component sources, reviewing applicable licenses, identifying known vulnerabilities, and documenting dependencies between models, datasets, frameworks, and application components.
Organizations should also establish requirements for maintaining accurate inventories of AI assets so they can be tracked throughout the build, deployment, and operational lifecycle.
| Framework Reference |
Security Activity |
CI/CD Implementation |
Suggested Open-Source Tools |
| NIST SSDF PW.4; OWASP LLM03 |
Third-party AI dependency review |
Evaluate AI frameworks, libraries, and externally sourced model dependencies before approving them for development use. |
OSV-Scanner, Trivy |
| NIST SP 800-218A; OWASP LLM03 |
AI model provenance |
Record model sources, versions, identifiers, and available integrity information for externally obtained AI models. |
Git LFS, DVC |
| NIST SSDF PS.2, PS.3 |
Model integrity verification |
Validate available checksums and signatures and preserve traceable records of approved AI artifacts. |
Sigstore Cosign, OpenSSF Model Signing |
| NIST SP 800-218A; OWASP LLM04 |
Dataset integrity and poisoning risk |
Track dataset sources, assess untrusted content, validate data integrity, and document potential poisoning risks. |
DVC, Great Expectations |
| NIST SSDF PW.4; OWASP LLM03 |
AI model file security |
Evaluate externally sourced model files for potentially unsafe serialized content before use. |
ModelScan |
| NIST SSDF PW.4 |
Software dependency vulnerability analysis |
Identify known vulnerabilities in AI frameworks, runtimes, packages, and supporting software components. |
OSV-Scanner, Trivy |
| NIST SSDF PW.4 |
License and usage review |
Review licensing obligations associated with AI frameworks, third-party packages, models, and datasets. |
ScanCode Toolkit, ORT |
| NIST SSDF PS.3 |
AI component inventory |
Maintain inventories of AI models, software dependencies, and supporting artifacts, including relationships where supported. |
Syft, CycloneDX, DVC |
| NIST SSDF PS.3; NIST SP 800-218A |
AI artifact traceability |
Associate approved models, datasets, and dependencies with source control revisions and release records. |
DVC, in-toto |
These tools address different aspects of AI supply chain security. Traditional SBOM tools do not necessarily capture complete model, dataset, or prompt inventories. Model provenance, dataset security, and licensing may require additional records and specialized validation.
Expected Security Evidence
- Inventory of approved AI models and associated versions.
- Records identifying model sources, repositories, and provenance.
- Model integrity verification results and available signatures.
- Dataset source records and integrity assessments.
- Documented assessments of data and model poisoning risks.
- Software dependency vulnerability scanning results.
- Model file security scan results.
- Third-party component license and usage reviews.
- AI component inventories and applicable SBOMs.
- Records of rejected or unapproved AI components.
- Traceable relationships between models, datasets, dependencies, and application development artifacts.
These artifacts provide evidence that AI models and supporting dependencies have been evaluated before entering the software delivery process.
Supply chain records created during Phase 1 should support model verification and artifact integrity controls in Phase 2: Build and Deploy, as well as continuous vulnerability management during Phase 3: Post Deploy.
Additional Resources
1.5 - Prompt and Agent Configuration Security
Protecting system prompts, agent instructions, tool definitions, and AI application configurations through version control, access policies, and security review.
Prompt and Agent Configuration Security - Phase 1: Code and Prebuild
AI-enabled applications rely on system prompts, agent instructions, tool definitions, and configuration files to determine how models interact with users, applications, and external services.
These artifacts can directly influence application behavior, data access, tool execution, and security boundaries.
Unlike traditional source code, prompts and agent configurations may be modified independently of application binaries. Unauthorized or poorly reviewed changes can introduce security risks even when the underlying application code remains unchanged.
During Code and Prebuild, organizations should treat security-sensitive prompts, agent instructions, and configurations as managed development artifacts.
This phase focuses on protecting AI configurations against unauthorized modification, establishing secure review processes, and ensuring that agent capabilities remain aligned with approved security policies.
The following activities map NIST security guidance and OWASP AI risk categories to actionable CI/CD practices and suggested open-source tools.
Prompt and Agent Configuration Security
Objective: Ensure system prompts, agent instructions, tool configurations, and AI application settings are version-controlled, reviewed, protected against unauthorized changes, and aligned with established security requirements.
The NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) establishes practices for protecting software artifacts, controlling changes, and integrating security requirements into development workflows.
The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications identifies prompt injection, system prompt leakage, and excessive agency as security concerns affecting AI-enabled applications.
For DevOps teams, prompts and agent configurations should be managed using established source control and change management practices.
Security-sensitive changes should be reviewed before acceptance, and automated policies should prevent unauthorized modifications to agent permissions, tool access, and execution settings.
System prompts should not be treated as a security boundary. Authorization must be enforced by trusted application and infrastructure controls independently of model instructions.
| Framework Reference |
Security Activity |
CI/CD Implementation |
Suggested Open-Source Tools |
| NIST SSDF PS.1 |
Prompt and configuration version control |
Maintain approved system prompts, agent instructions, and tool definitions in protected source repositories. |
Git, Gitea |
| NIST SSDF PS.1, PS.2 |
Configuration integrity |
Protect security-sensitive configuration files against unauthorized changes and verify approved versions before use. |
Git, Sigstore Cosign |
| NIST SSDF PW.7 |
Security review of prompt changes |
Review modifications to system prompts, agent instructions, and tool configurations before merging changes. |
Gitea, Open Policy Agent |
| OWASP LLM01 |
Prompt injection risk reduction |
Identify untrusted input paths and test whether external content can alter system instructions or agent behavior. |
Promptfoo, Garak |
| OWASP LLM07 |
System prompt information protection |
Prevent secrets and credentials from being embedded in prompts and assess unintended disclosure of sensitive instructions or information. |
Gitleaks, detect-secrets |
| OWASP LLM06 |
Agent tool configuration security |
Restrict approved tools, commands, API operations, and agent permissions through enforceable security policies. |
Open Policy Agent, Conftest |
| NIST SSDF PO.5; OWASP LLM06 |
Configuration access control |
Limit modification of agent permissions, prompt templates, and tool definitions to authorized identities. |
Keycloak, Casbin |
| NIST SSDF PS.1; OWASP LLM01 |
Configuration validation |
Validate structured agent configurations against approved schemas and security policy requirements. |
JSON Schema, Conftest |
| NIST SSDF PO.3, PS.1 |
Configuration change traceability |
Record changes, approvals, and versions of security-sensitive AI configuration artifacts. |
Git, Gitea |
The referenced frameworks provide relevant software security practices and AI risk categories. The implementation recommendations translate those practices into CI/CD controls for prompts, agent instructions, and configuration artifacts.
Expected Security Evidence
- Version-controlled system prompts and agent instructions.
- Approved tool definitions and agent configuration records.
- Security review and approval records for configuration changes.
- Documented policies restricting agent permissions and tool access.
- Configuration validation and policy enforcement results.
- Secrets scanning results for prompts and configuration files.
- Prompt injection testing results and identified security findings.
- Records of unauthorized or rejected configuration modifications.
- Traceable configuration versions associated with application changes.
- Documented procedures for updating and restoring approved AI configurations.
These artifacts provide evidence that AI instructions and configurations are managed through controlled development processes.
Configuration controls established during Phase 1 should support security testing and release verification during Phase 2: Build and Deploy.
After deployment, changes to AI instructions, tools, and permissions should remain subject to authorization, monitoring, and audit requirements.
Additional Resources
2 - Build and Deploy
Securing AI-generated code, validating AI models, testing AI applications, and enforcing secure build and deployment controls.
Validating AI Artifacts and Securing AI-Enabled Software Delivery
Artificial intelligence introduces new security considerations into the build and deployment process. AI-generated code, machine learning models, prompts, agent configurations, and supporting dependencies must be validated before they are incorporated into production software.
Phase 2: Build and Deploy focuses on ensuring that AI-generated code and AI application components are securely built, tested, verified, and authorized for deployment.
This phase extends traditional CI/CD security practices to address AI-specific vulnerabilities, model integrity, adversarial testing, agent permissions, and the traceability of AI-related software artifacts.
The objective is to establish automated security controls that verify the integrity and security of AI-enabled software before it reaches production.
Phase 2 Outcomes
By implementing these practices, DevOps teams establish automated security controls for validating and deploying AI-enabled software.
Expected outcomes include:
- AI-generated code is validated using established secure development and testing practices.
- AI models and supporting artifacts are verified for integrity and provenance.
- AI applications are tested for prompt injection, unsafe behavior, and unauthorized tool execution.
- Autonomous agents and AI services operate within defined deployment permissions.
- Software releases include traceable AI artifacts, dependencies, and security evaluation results.
- Deployment authorization and security policies are consistently enforced.
- Security evidence is available for ongoing vulnerability management and compliance assessments.
These outcomes help ensure that AI-enabled applications enter production with verified artifacts, tested security controls, and traceable release information.
The following frameworks provide guidance relevant to Phase 2 AI security activities.
| Framework |
Relevant Guidance |
| NIST SP 800-218 – Secure Software Development Framework |
Secure software production, security testing, artifact protection, and vulnerability identification. |
| NIST SP 800-218A – AI SSDF Profile |
AI-specific secure development practices, including AI model security and lifecycle considerations. |
| NIST AI Risk Management Framework |
AI risk measurement, evaluation, validation, and risk management. |
| OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications |
Prompt injection, sensitive information disclosure, supply chain vulnerabilities, excessive agency, and other AI application risks. |
| OpenSSF Model Signing |
Signing and verification of AI model artifacts to support integrity and provenance. |
| SLSA |
Software supply chain integrity, build provenance, and protection against artifact tampering. |
These frameworks and projects provide guidance and technical capabilities that can support AI security controls. They do not all establish mandatory regulatory compliance requirements.
Integrating AI Security into the CI/CD Pipeline
AI security controls should be incorporated into existing CI/CD automation rather than implemented as disconnected manual processes.
This section will cover a typical AI-enabled software delivery workflow to include:
2.1 - AI-Generated Code Validation
Validating AI-generated code through automated security testing, dependency analysis, regression testing, and controlled CI/CD release gates.
AI-Generated Code Validation - Phase 2: Build and Deploy
Artificial intelligence is increasingly used to generate source code, update dependencies, modify configurations, and create pull requests. These changes can accelerate software delivery but may introduce vulnerabilities, insecure coding patterns, compatibility problems, and unintended functionality.
During Build and Deploy, organizations should independently validate AI-generated changes using established security testing and software quality controls.
AI-generated code should not be trusted solely because an AI assistant or autonomous agent reports that its changes are secure or functional.
This activity focuses on incorporating automated scanning, testing, and release authorization into CI/CD workflows to ensure AI-generated code meets established security requirements before deployment.
AI-Generated Code Validation
Objective: Ensure AI-generated code and configuration changes are independently tested, reviewed, and validated for security vulnerabilities, vulnerable dependencies, exposed secrets, and unintended functionality before software is released.
The NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) establishes practices for reviewing, analyzing, and testing software to identify vulnerabilities before release.
The NIST AI SSDF Profile (SP 800-218A) extends secure development guidance to address AI-related development considerations.
For DevOps teams, automated CI/CD validation provides an independent security control between AI-generated changes and production deployment.
Security gates should prevent code from progressing when required validation fails. Human review or authorized policy decisions should determine whether changes are accepted, rejected, or returned for remediation.
| Framework Reference |
Security Activity |
CI/CD Implementation |
Suggested Open-Source Tools |
| NIST SSDF PW.7 |
Static code security analysis |
Run SAST against AI-generated code to identify insecure coding patterns and potential vulnerabilities. |
Semgrep, Bandit |
| NIST SSDF PW.4, PW.7 |
Dependency vulnerability scanning |
Evaluate dependencies introduced or modified by AI-generated code against known vulnerability databases. |
OSV-Scanner, Trivy |
| NIST SSDF PW.5, PW.7 |
Secrets detection |
Scan AI-generated source code and configuration files for exposed credentials, tokens, and API keys. |
Gitleaks, detect-secrets |
| NIST SSDF PW.8 |
Automated security and regression testing |
Execute unit, integration, regression, and applicable security tests against AI-generated changes. |
pytest, OWASP ZAP |
| NIST SSDF PW.8 |
Dependency compatibility validation |
Build and test applications after AI-generated dependency upgrades to detect compatibility failures and regressions. |
Jenkins, Tekton |
| NIST SSDF PO.1, PW.7 |
Security policy enforcement |
Apply automated acceptance criteria and prevent changes from proceeding when required security checks fail. |
Open Policy Agent, Conftest |
| NIST SSDF PS.2 |
Artifact integrity |
Ensure release artifacts are produced from approved changes and verify applicable artifact signatures. |
Sigstore Cosign, in-toto |
| NIST SSDF PW.7, RV.2 |
Failed validation and remediation tracking |
Record failed security checks, rejected changes, and remediation activities for review and resolution. |
DefectDojo, Jenkins |
These mappings apply established secure software development practices to AI-generated changes. AI-generated code remains subject to the same security requirements as human-written code.
Expected Security Evidence
- Automated static application security testing reports.
- Dependency vulnerability scanning results.
- Secrets detection and remediation records.
- Unit, integration, and regression test results.
- Build and dependency compatibility validation logs.
- Records of rejected or failed AI-generated changes.
- Code review and release approval records.
- Security policy enforcement results.
- Artifact verification and provenance records.
- Traceable pull requests linking AI-generated changes to validation results.
These artifacts demonstrate that AI-generated changes have been independently validated before entering production.
Security findings should be resolved, rejected, or formally accepted through an authorized risk management process before deployment.
Additional Resources
2.2 - AI Model and Artifact Integrity
Verifying AI model provenance, signatures, artifact integrity, and trusted model distribution throughout the CI/CD pipeline.
AI Model and Artifact Integrity - Phase 2: Build and Deploy
AI-enabled applications increasingly incorporate pretrained models, fine-tuned models, embeddings, model adapters, and supporting software artifacts obtained from external repositories.
These artifacts introduce supply chain security risks, including compromised models, unauthorized modifications, unsafe serialization formats, and untrusted dependencies.
During Build and Deploy, organizations should verify that AI models and supporting artifacts originate from approved sources and have not been modified unexpectedly.
This activity extends established software supply chain security practices to AI models, associated dependencies, and release artifacts.
AI Model and Artifact Integrity
Objective: Ensure AI models and supporting software artifacts are verified for provenance, integrity, authenticity, and known security risks before packaging or deployment.
The NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) establishes practices for protecting software artifacts and verifying software integrity.
The NIST AI SSDF Profile (SP 800-218A) addresses additional security considerations associated with AI model development and integration.
The OpenSSF Model Signing project provides open-source capabilities for signing and verifying AI model artifacts.
For DevOps teams, model verification should become an automated CI/CD activity similar to container signature verification, dependency scanning, and software artifact validation.
Model signatures and checksums help establish artifact integrity, but do not independently prove that a model is free of malicious behavior or vulnerabilities. Additional security assessments remain necessary.
| Framework Reference |
Security Activity |
CI/CD Implementation |
Suggested Open-Source Tools |
| NIST SSDF PS.2; OWASP LLM03 |
Model provenance verification |
Verify model origin, approved distribution source, version, and associated provenance records before use. |
OpenSSF Model Signing, in-toto |
| NIST SSDF PS.2 |
Cryptographic model integrity |
Validate cryptographic hashes or signatures to detect unauthorized modifications to model artifacts. |
OpenSSF Model Signing, Sigstore Cosign |
| NIST SSDF PW.4; OWASP LLM03 |
Model file security |
Scan supported AI model formats for potentially malicious serialized content and unsafe loading mechanisms. |
ModelScan |
| NIST SSDF PW.4, PW.7 |
Model dependency vulnerability analysis |
Scan frameworks, libraries, containers, and supporting software components for known vulnerabilities. |
Trivy, OSV-Scanner |
| NIST SSDF PS.3 |
Model and dependency inventory |
Record model identifiers, versions, approved sources, and supporting software dependencies. |
Syft, CycloneDX |
| NIST SSDF PS.2, PS.3 |
Model version traceability |
Associate model versions and approved artifacts with application release records. |
DVC, Git LFS |
| NIST SSDF PS.2 |
Build provenance and attestations |
Generate and preserve provenance records identifying how artifacts were built and verified. |
SLSA, in-toto |
| NIST SSDF PO.1, PS.2 |
Artifact admission policies |
Prevent unapproved or unverified model and software artifacts from proceeding to deployment. |
Kyverno, Open Policy Agent |
Artifact integrity and model security are related but distinct. Signature verification establishes properties of the artifact and its origin, while behavioral evaluations and vulnerability scanning assess different security risks.
Expected Security Evidence
- Inventory of approved AI models and artifact versions.
- Model provenance and source verification records.
- Model checksum and signature verification results.
- Model file security scanning reports.
- Software dependency vulnerability reports.
- Model and software component inventories.
- Build provenance and release attestations.
- Records of approved and rejected model artifacts.
- Deployment policy enforcement results.
- Traceable relationships between model artifacts and application releases.
These artifacts provide evidence that AI model integrity and provenance are evaluated before deployment.
Verified model records should be retained for post-deployment inventory management, vulnerability analysis, and incident investigation.
Additional Resources
2.3 - AI Security Testing and Red Teaming
Evaluating AI applications for prompt injection, sensitive data disclosure, excessive agency, unsafe outputs, and adversarial security risks.
AI Security Testing and Red Teaming - Phase 2: Build and Deploy
AI-enabled applications introduce security risks that traditional application security testing may not fully identify.
Large language models (LLMs), retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems, and autonomous AI agents process dynamic inputs, interact with external information, and may invoke tools or execute actions.
These capabilities create attack surfaces involving prompt injection, sensitive information disclosure, unauthorized tool execution, insecure output handling, and excessive agency.
During Build and Deploy, organizations should incorporate AI-specific security evaluations and adversarial testing into CI/CD workflows.
This activity focuses on identifying unsafe AI application behavior before production deployment and establishing repeatable security testing practices.
AI Security Testing and Red Teaming
Objective: Identify AI-specific vulnerabilities and unsafe behavior through automated security evaluations, adversarial testing, and independently enforced release acceptance criteria.
The NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) establishes security testing and vulnerability identification practices for software releases.
The NIST AI Risk Management Framework emphasizes evaluating and managing risks throughout the AI system lifecycle.
The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications identifies common AI application security risks, including prompt injection, sensitive information disclosure, improper output handling, and excessive agency.
For DevOps teams, AI security evaluations should be automated wherever practical and incorporated into existing build and release validation processes.
Security testing should evaluate not only the model’s responses but also whether the application enforces access controls, protects sensitive information, and prevents unauthorized tool actions.
Because AI behavior may be nondeterministic, teams should define repeatable test scenarios, execution parameters, evaluation criteria, and acceptable failure thresholds.
| Framework Reference |
Security Activity |
CI/CD Implementation |
Suggested Open-Source Tools |
| OWASP LLM01 |
Prompt injection testing |
Test whether malicious direct or indirect prompts can override instructions or cause unauthorized application behavior. |
Promptfoo, Garak |
| OWASP LLM02 |
Sensitive information disclosure testing |
Evaluate whether AI responses expose confidential data, credentials, personal information, or restricted context. |
Promptfoo, Microsoft Presidio |
| OWASP LLM05 |
Improper output handling |
Test whether AI-generated content can trigger unsafe downstream operations, including injection or command execution. |
OWASP ZAP, Semgrep |
| OWASP LLM06 |
Excessive agency testing |
Evaluate whether AI agents can invoke unauthorized tools, exceed assigned permissions, or perform unapproved actions. |
Inspect AI, Promptfoo |
| OWASP LLM08 |
RAG and retrieval security testing |
Test retrieval workflows for untrusted content injection, unauthorized access, and manipulation of retrieved information. |
Garak, Promptfoo |
| OWASP LLM10 |
Resource consumption testing |
Assess whether requests can cause excessive model execution, resource exhaustion, or uncontrolled service usage. |
k6, Locust |
| NIST SSDF PW.8; NIST AI RMF MEASURE |
Automated security evaluation |
Execute predefined adversarial evaluations and retain measurable security testing results. |
Inspect AI, Promptfoo |
| NIST SSDF PW.8, RV.2 |
Security regression testing |
Reexecute security evaluations after changes to models, prompts, tools, dependencies, or application logic. |
Jenkins, Tekton |
| NIST SSDF PO.1, PW.8 |
Security release gates |
Apply measurable security acceptance criteria and prevent releases when required AI security evaluations fail. |
Open Policy Agent, Conftest |
AI security testing tools have different capabilities and coverage. No single testing tool can establish that an AI application is free of vulnerabilities or unsafe behaviors.
Expected Security Evidence
- AI application security test plans and acceptance criteria.
- Prompt injection testing results.
- Sensitive information disclosure evaluation reports.
- Agent permission and tool execution test results.
- RAG and retrieval security testing records.
- Resource consumption and abuse testing results.
- Security regression test results.
- Records of identified vulnerabilities and remediation activities.
- Automated security gate results.
- Approved exceptions and documented residual risks.
- Traceable AI evaluation results associated with application releases.
These artifacts demonstrate that AI applications have undergone defined security evaluations before deployment.
Security testing should be repeated when significant changes occur to models, prompts, agent permissions, retrieval sources, or connected tools.
Additional Resources
2.4 - Secure AI Deployment
Deploying AI applications and agents with least-privilege access, secure configurations, secrets protection, workload isolation, and release authorization.
Secure AI Deployment - Phase 2: Build and Deploy
AI-enabled applications often depend on models, external APIs, vector databases, retrieval services, and autonomous agents that interact with other applications and infrastructure.
These integrations introduce security risks when deployed applications or agents receive excessive permissions, unrestricted network access, sensitive credentials, or unauthorized tool capabilities.
During Build and Deploy, organizations should ensure AI applications and autonomous agents are deployed within controlled environments that enforce access policies, workload isolation, secure configuration, and release authorization.
This activity extends established CI/CD deployment security practices to address the operational capabilities and security requirements of AI-enabled applications.
Secure AI Deployment
Objective: Ensure AI applications, models, and autonomous agents are deployed using verified artifacts, controlled identities, least-privilege permissions, protected credentials, and independently enforced security policies.
The NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) establishes practices for protecting software development environments and ensuring the integrity of software releases.
The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications identifies excessive agency, prompt injection, and improper output handling as risks that can affect deployed AI applications.
For DevOps teams, secure deployment should ensure that AI services and agents operate only within approved access and execution boundaries.
AI-generated instructions must not independently grant permissions or authorize privileged operations. Access decisions should be enforced by trusted application, identity, and infrastructure controls.
| Framework Reference |
Security Activity |
CI/CD Implementation |
Suggested Open-Source Tools |
| NIST SSDF PO.5; OWASP LLM06 |
Workload identity and authentication |
Assign controlled workload identities to AI applications and agents and authenticate access to protected services. |
SPIRE, Keycloak |
| NIST SSDF PO.5; OWASP LLM06 |
Least-privilege authorization |
Restrict access to repositories, databases, APIs, tools, and infrastructure based on approved policies. |
Open Policy Agent, Casbin |
| NIST SSDF PO.5 |
Secrets management |
Protect credentials and API keys through secure configuration and controlled secrets distribution. |
SOPS, External Secrets Operator |
| NIST SSDF PO.5 |
Workload isolation |
Deploy AI workloads in controlled environments with restricted execution privileges and resource boundaries. |
Kubernetes, gVisor |
| OWASP LLM06 |
Agent tool authorization |
Enforce restrictions on the tools, commands, and external operations that agents can invoke. |
Open Policy Agent, Kyverno |
| NIST SSDF PS.2 |
Deployment artifact verification |
Verify approved container images and applicable artifact signatures before deployment. |
Sigstore Cosign, Kyverno |
| NIST SSDF PO.5 |
Network access restrictions |
Restrict connections between AI workloads, internal resources, and external services. |
Cilium, Kubernetes NetworkPolicy |
| NIST SSDF PO.1, PS.2 |
Deployment authorization |
Apply release approval policies and prevent deployment of unauthorized or unverified AI components. |
Open Policy Agent, Argo CD |
| NIST SSDF PO.3, PS.1 |
Deployment traceability |
Record deployed versions, configuration changes, approvals, and release history. |
Argo CD, Flux |
These controls apply established software security and infrastructure practices to AI-enabled applications. Deployment authorization and infrastructure security controls should operate independently of model-generated decisions.
Expected Security Evidence
- Approved AI deployment configurations.
- Workload identity and authentication records.
- Agent permission and authorization policies.
- Secrets management and credential access configurations.
- Workload isolation and network security policies.
- Verified container and artifact signatures.
- Deployment policy enforcement records.
- Release approval and change authorization evidence.
- Deployment configuration and version history.
- Records of rejected or unauthorized deployment attempts.
These artifacts provide evidence that AI applications and agents are deployed within controlled environments and operate under defined security restrictions.
Deployment evidence should be retained for continuous security monitoring, vulnerability management, and incident response during Phase 3: Post Deploy.
Additional Resources
2.5 - AI Release Evidence and Inventory
Maintaining traceable inventories of AI models, prompts, dependencies, configurations, security evaluations, and deployment evidence.
AI Release Evidence and Inventory - Phase 2: Build and Deploy
AI-enabled software releases may include more than traditional source code, libraries, and container images.
Applications can depend on AI models, prompts, agent configurations, retrieval components, external services, and supporting datasets that influence their behavior.
Without an accurate inventory of these components, organizations may struggle to identify which AI assets are deployed, determine which systems are affected by security findings, or reproduce the configuration of a previous release.
During Build and Deploy, organizations should create and retain inventories and security evidence that associate AI components with their application releases and deployment records.
This activity focuses on establishing traceability across the AI software supply chain and ensuring security evidence remains available after deployment.
AI Release Evidence and Inventory
Objective: Maintain accurate, traceable records of AI models, prompts, agent configurations, software dependencies, security evaluations, and deployment artifacts associated with each software release.
The NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) establishes practices for preserving software integrity, tracking software components, and generating evidence associated with secure development.
The NIST AI SSDF Profile (SP 800-218A) extends secure development guidance to address AI model development and lifecycle considerations.
For DevOps teams, release inventories should extend beyond traditional Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs) to include relevant AI assets and their relationships to deployed applications.
An SBOM identifies software components and dependencies, but may not fully capture models, datasets, prompts, and agent configurations. Additional AI-specific inventories or metadata may therefore be necessary.
The resulting release evidence should enable teams to determine what was built, what was tested, what was approved, and what was deployed.
| Framework Reference |
Security Activity |
CI/CD Implementation |
Suggested Open-Source Tools |
| NIST SSDF PS.3 |
Software component inventory |
Generate SBOMs identifying application packages, libraries, containers, and supporting software dependencies. |
Syft, CycloneDX |
| NIST SP 800-218A; NIST SSDF PS.3 |
AI model inventory |
Record model identifiers, versions, approved sources, artifact hashes, and relationships to application releases. |
DVC, MLflow |
| NIST SSDF PS.1, PS.3 |
Prompt and agent configuration tracking |
Associate approved prompt versions, agent instructions, tool definitions, and configuration revisions with releases. |
Git, DVC |
| NIST SSDF PS.3 |
AI dependency relationships |
Document relationships among AI models, application components, software packages, and supporting artifacts. |
CycloneDX, GUAC |
| NIST SSDF PS.2 |
Artifact integrity evidence |
Record cryptographic verification results and signatures for approved release artifacts. |
Sigstore Cosign, OpenSSF Model Signing |
| NIST SSDF PS.2, PS.3 |
Build provenance |
Generate attestations identifying trusted build processes, source revisions, and resulting release artifacts. |
SLSA, in-toto |
| NIST SSDF PW.8 |
AI security evaluation evidence |
Preserve test cases, AI security evaluation results, identified risks, and release acceptance decisions. |
Promptfoo, Inspect AI |
| NIST SSDF PO.3, PS.3 |
Deployment evidence |
Record approved application versions, deployment configurations, release identifiers, and target environments. |
Argo CD, Flux |
| NIST SSDF RV.1, RV.2 |
Vulnerability traceability |
Associate identified vulnerabilities and remediation records with relevant software components and releases. |
OSV, GUAC, Ortelius |
Release inventories may require multiple complementary formats and tools. SBOMs, model metadata, provenance attestations, security evaluation results, and deployment records serve different purposes and should be linked using stable identifiers wherever practical.
Expected Security Evidence
- Software Bills of Materials for applicable software artifacts.
- AI model inventories identifying model names, versions, and sources.
- Model integrity verification records.
- Approved prompt and agent configuration versions.
- AI dependency and component relationship records.
- Build provenance and artifact attestations.
- AI security testing and evaluation reports.
- Vulnerability scanning and remediation records.
- Release approvals and authorization decisions.
- Deployment records identifying target environments and application versions.
- Traceable links between AI artifacts, application releases, and deployed systems.
- Retained security evidence supporting investigation, audits, and vulnerability management.
These artifacts provide a record of the software and AI components included in each release and the security controls applied before deployment.
Release inventories should remain available after deployment so newly discovered vulnerabilities can be correlated with affected software components, AI models, applications, and environments.
This information provides the foundation for continuous vulnerability management, affected-system identification, and incident response during Phase 3: Post Deploy.
Additional Resources
3 - Post Deployment
Continuously monitoring deployed AI applications, managing vulnerabilities, auditing autonomous agents, and supporting secure AI-assisted remediation.
Security does not stop when an AI-enabled application reaches production. New vulnerabilities are discovered, AI models and dependencies change, autonomous agents interact with external systems, and emerging threats can affect applications long after their initial deployment.
Phase 3: Post Deploy focuses on maintaining continuous security visibility into deployed AI applications, models, agents, and their supporting software components.
This phase extends traditional vulnerability management and runtime security practices to address AI-specific threats, including prompt injection, unauthorized agent activity, sensitive information disclosure, model compromise, and unsafe automated actions.
It also explores how artificial intelligence can support vulnerability analysis and remediation while maintaining independent validation, human oversight, and auditable security controls.
The objective is to ensure that deployed AI-enabled software remains secure throughout its operational lifecycle.
Why AI Security Must Continue After Deployment
Traditional post-deployment security activities focus on monitoring applications, identifying vulnerabilities, detecting suspicious behavior, and applying security updates.
AI-enabled applications introduce additional challenges:
- Changing AI Threats: Newly discovered attack techniques can affect deployed AI applications without requiring changes to their underlying source code.
- Autonomous Agent Activity: AI agents may execute commands, access APIs, modify resources, or interact with external systems during production operations.
- Model and Dependency Vulnerabilities: Deployed AI services depend on models, frameworks, libraries, containers, and supporting infrastructure that may develop new security exposures.
- Prompt Injection and Data Exposure: Malicious inputs and untrusted external content can manipulate model behavior or expose sensitive information.
- Limited Deployment Visibility: Organizations may lack an accurate inventory of which AI models, prompts, dependencies, and configurations are running in production.
- AI-Assisted Remediation Risks: AI-generated security fixes may introduce compatibility issues, unintended changes, or new vulnerabilities if applied without validation.
Addressing these challenges requires continuous security monitoring, accurate deployed asset inventories, and controlled remediation workflows.
Phase 3: Post Deployment Outcomes
By implementing these practices, DevOps and security teams establish continuous security oversight for deployed AI-enabled software.
Expected outcomes include:
- Deployed AI applications are monitored for suspicious behavior, unauthorized access, and emerging threats.
- AI agents operate with observable and auditable execution histories.
- Newly disclosed software vulnerabilities are correlated with affected production applications and dependencies.
- AI-specific behavioral risks are assessed alongside traditional software vulnerabilities.
- AI-assisted remediation changes are independently tested and approved before release.
- Compromised models, agents, and applications can be isolated, rolled back, or recovered.
- Security evidence supports incident investigation, vulnerability management, and compliance assessments.
- Production security findings provide feedback into earlier CI/CD security activities.
These outcomes support a continuous security model in which monitoring, vulnerability identification, remediation, and verification extend throughout the operational lifecycle.
The following frameworks provide guidance relevant to Phase 3 AI security activities.
| Framework |
Relevant Guidance |
| NIST SP 800-218 – Secure Software Development Framework |
Vulnerability identification, remediation, root cause analysis, and improvements to secure development practices. |
| NIST SP 800-218A – AI SSDF Profile |
AI-specific secure development and vulnerability management considerations across the AI lifecycle. |
| NIST AI Risk Management Framework |
Monitoring, measurement, governance, and ongoing management of AI-related risks. |
| OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications |
AI security risks including prompt injection, sensitive information disclosure, improper output handling, excessive agency, and model-related threats. |
| NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 |
Continuous cybersecurity risk management, detection, response, and recovery activities. |
| NIST SP 800-61 – Incident Response |
Incident response planning, detection, analysis, containment, and recovery. |
| OpenSSF |
Open-source software supply chain security, vulnerability management, and secure development practices. |
These frameworks provide guidance for implementing and managing AI security controls. They do not all establish mandatory regulatory compliance requirements.
Integrating AI Security into the CI/CD Pipeline
AI security controls should be incorporated into existing CI/CD automation rather than implemented as disconnected manual processes.
This section will cover a typical AI-enabled software delivery workflow to include:
3.1 - AI Runtime Security Monitoring
Continuously monitoring deployed AI applications for prompt injection, sensitive information exposure, suspicious model behavior, and runtime security threats.
AI Runtime Security Monitoring - Phase 3: Post Deploy
Artificial intelligence applications introduce runtime behaviors that traditional application security monitoring may not fully capture. Large language models (LLMs), retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems, and autonomous agents interact with users, external data sources, APIs, and supporting services in ways that can create additional security risks.
These risks include prompt injection, sensitive information disclosure, unauthorized tool execution, model manipulation, and resource abuse.
During Post Deploy, organizations should continuously monitor AI applications to identify suspicious activity, detect security policy violations, and respond to emerging threats.
This activity extends established runtime security monitoring practices to include AI-specific behavior, model interactions, and application security events.
AI Runtime Security Monitoring
Objective: Detect and investigate suspicious AI application behavior, unauthorized access, prompt injection attempts, sensitive information exposure, and runtime security policy violations.
The NIST AI Risk Management Framework emphasizes ongoing measurement, monitoring, and management of risks associated with AI systems.
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 provides guidance for identifying, detecting, responding to, and recovering from cybersecurity threats.
The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications identifies AI-specific threats including prompt injection, sensitive information disclosure, excessive agency, and unbounded consumption.
For DevOps teams, runtime monitoring should combine application telemetry, infrastructure security events, AI interaction traces, and independently enforced security policies.
Monitoring should collect sufficient information to investigate suspicious behavior while protecting confidential prompts, user information, credentials, and sensitive model outputs.
AI-generated explanations of suspicious activity should not replace independently collected security evidence.
| Framework Reference |
Security Activity |
CI/CD Implementation |
Suggested Open-Source Tools |
| NIST AI RMF MEASURE, MANAGE |
AI application runtime observability |
Collect application traces, metrics, errors, and AI interaction telemetry to establish operational and security baselines. |
OpenTelemetry, Prometheus |
| OWASP LLM01 |
Prompt injection monitoring |
Monitor suspicious input patterns and use security evaluations to investigate potential prompt injection attempts. |
Promptfoo, Garak |
| OWASP LLM02 |
Sensitive information exposure detection |
Detect potentially exposed sensitive information in appropriately authorized and protected application telemetry. |
Microsoft Presidio, OpenTelemetry |
| OWASP LLM05, LLM06 |
Suspicious tool execution |
Detect unexpected commands, process execution, and unauthorized operations initiated by AI-enabled applications. |
Falco, Tetragon |
| OWASP LLM10 |
Resource abuse monitoring |
Monitor inference request rates, resource consumption, service latency, and abnormal usage patterns. |
Prometheus, Grafana |
| NIST CSF DE.CM |
Continuous infrastructure monitoring |
Monitor containers, Kubernetes workloads, and supporting AI application infrastructure for suspicious activity. |
Falco, Wazuh |
| NIST CSF DE.AE |
Security event correlation |
Correlate AI application events with infrastructure logs, authentication records, and security alerts. |
OpenSearch, Wazuh |
| NIST AI RMF MANAGE |
Runtime policy enforcement |
Enforce defined access, network, and execution policies independently of model-generated instructions. |
Open Policy Agent, Kyverno |
| NIST CSF DE.CM, RS.AN |
Security investigation and evidence |
Preserve security-relevant telemetry and records needed to investigate suspected AI incidents. |
OpenTelemetry, OpenSearch |
Observability tools collect and analyze runtime information but do not automatically detect every AI-specific attack. Prompt injection testing tools primarily support security evaluations and require additional integration for continuous monitoring.
Expected Security Evidence
- AI application runtime monitoring configurations.
- AI service traces, metrics, and security event records.
- Records of detected suspicious input or application behavior.
- Unauthorized tool execution and access violation alerts.
- Sensitive information exposure detection results.
- Resource usage and abnormal consumption monitoring reports.
- Infrastructure and container runtime security findings.
- Correlated application and security event records.
- Security incident investigation records.
- Runtime policy enforcement and alert response evidence.
These artifacts demonstrate that deployed AI applications are subject to continuous security monitoring and that security-relevant events can be investigated.
Monitoring findings should feed into vulnerability management, incident response, and the security requirements applied during earlier CI/CD phases.
Additional Resources
3.2 - Continuous AI Vulnerability Management
Identifying vulnerabilities in deployed AI applications, correlating vulnerable dependencies with production environments, and managing AI-specific behavioral security risks.
Continuous AI Vulnerability Management - Phase 3: Post Deploy
AI-enabled applications depend on software frameworks, model-serving infrastructure, libraries, containers, APIs, and supporting services that may become vulnerable after deployment.
A software component that passes security testing during development may later be affected by a newly disclosed Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) record.
Traditional pre-deployment scanning cannot detect vulnerabilities that become known after software has already been released.
AI applications also introduce behavioral security risks, including prompt injection, excessive agent permissions, sensitive information disclosure, and manipulation of model outputs. These weaknesses may not have CVE identifiers and cannot always be addressed through traditional software patching.
During Post Deploy, organizations should continuously monitor both newly disclosed software vulnerabilities and AI-specific behavioral security risks.
This activity focuses on maintaining deployed software visibility, identifying affected environments, assessing AI-specific threats, prioritizing remediation, and verifying that corrective actions reach affected production systems.
Continuous AI Vulnerability Management
Objective: Continuously identify, assess, prioritize, and remediate software vulnerabilities and AI-specific behavioral security weaknesses affecting deployed AI applications, dependencies, agents, and supporting infrastructure.
The NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) establishes practices for identifying vulnerabilities in released software, assessing their impact, and implementing appropriate responses.
The NIST AI SSDF Profile (SP 800-218A) extends secure development guidance to address AI model development and integration.
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 provides guidance for identifying technology assets, managing vulnerabilities, assessing risks, and implementing appropriate responses.
The NIST AI Risk Management Framework provides guidance for identifying, measuring, monitoring, and managing risks associated with AI systems.
The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications identifies AI-specific security risks, including prompt injection, sensitive information disclosure, improper output handling, and excessive agency.
For DevOps teams, continuous AI security requires two complementary practices:
- Software Vulnerability Management: Identify known software vulnerabilities, correlate findings with deployed components, and verify remediation.
- AI Behavioral Risk Management: Identify and mitigate AI-specific weaknesses through adversarial testing, runtime monitoring, access controls, and application security improvements.
These practices should share application inventory, ownership, and deployment information while maintaining distinct methods for assessing and remediating security findings.
Software Vulnerability Management - NIST SSDF
Software vulnerability management focuses on identifying, assessing, and remediating known vulnerabilities in deployed software components, including AI frameworks, libraries, containers, model-serving infrastructure, and supporting services.
NIST SSDF practices RV.1 and RV.2 establish processes for identifying and responding to vulnerabilities in released software.
For DevOps teams, vulnerability management must extend beyond creating Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs) and scanning release artifacts.
SBOM information should be associated with application versions and deployment metadata so teams can identify which vulnerable components are actually running, where they are deployed, and who is responsible for remediation.
Continuous monitoring of vulnerability intelligence sources enables organizations to identify vulnerabilities disclosed after deployment and determine their potential impact on production applications.
Remediation should be prioritized based on severity, known exploitation, exposure, affected production systems, and operational risk.
| Framework Reference |
Security Activity |
CI/CD Implementation |
Suggested Open-Source Tools |
| NIST SSDF PS.3; NIST CSF ID.AM |
Deployed AI component inventory |
Maintain records of deployed applications, AI frameworks, model-serving components, software packages, and supporting dependencies. |
Syft, CycloneDX |
| NIST SSDF RV.1 |
Continuous vulnerability intelligence |
Monitor vulnerability databases for newly disclosed vulnerabilities affecting deployed software components. |
OSV, OSV-Scanner |
| NIST SSDF RV.1; NIST CSF ID.RA |
Deployed vulnerability correlation |
Associate vulnerability findings with SBOM components, application releases, and deployment records to identify affected environments. |
Ortelius, GUAC |
| NIST SSDF RV.1 |
Container and dependency vulnerability assessment |
Reassess container images and application dependencies against updated vulnerability intelligence. |
Trivy, Grype |
| NIST CSF ID.RA |
Vulnerability prioritization |
Prioritize vulnerabilities based on severity, known exploitation, exposure, and affected production assets. |
OSV, DefectDojo |
| NIST SSDF PS.3, RV.1 |
Affected application identification |
Trace vulnerable components to associated software artifacts, deployments, and application ownership records. |
Ortelius, GUAC |
| NIST SSDF RV.2 |
Remediation tracking |
Record vulnerability ownership, remediation decisions, affected releases, and outstanding corrective actions. |
DefectDojo, Gitea |
| NIST SSDF RV.2 |
Remediation verification |
Rescan affected software and confirm that patched components have reached the relevant deployment environments. |
Trivy, Ortelius |
Vulnerability discovery, software supply chain correlation, and deployment inventory are complementary capabilities. An SBOM scanner identifies software components and may detect known vulnerabilities, while deployment correlation is needed to determine which applications and environments are affected.
Software Vulnerability Management - Expected Security Evidence
- Inventory of deployed AI applications and supporting software components.
- SBOMs associated with released application versions.
- Deployment records identifying environments and affected assets.
- Newly disclosed CVE detection records.
- Correlations between vulnerable packages and deployed applications.
- Vulnerability severity, exploitability, and exposure assessments.
- Documented vulnerability ownership and prioritization decisions.
- Remediation tracking records and assigned corrective actions.
- Post-remediation vulnerability scanning results.
- Evidence confirming deployment of corrected software versions.
These artifacts provide evidence that software vulnerability management continues after deployment and that newly disclosed vulnerabilities can be associated with affected production systems.
Vulnerability findings should initiate appropriate remediation workflows, including the AI-assisted remediation activities described in this phase.
AI Behavioral Risk Management - OWASP and NIST AI RMF
AI-enabled applications introduce behavioral security weaknesses that may not be associated with a known CVE or vulnerable software package. These weaknesses arise from how AI systems process instructions, interact with external content, access tools, and make decisions.
Examples include prompt injection, excessive agency, sensitive information disclosure, unsafe output handling, and manipulation of retrieved information.
Unlike traditional software vulnerabilities, these issues may require changes to application architecture, trust boundaries, authorization policies, model configurations, prompts, or agent permissions rather than dependency upgrades.The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications identifies common AI-specific security risks, while the NIST AI Risk Management Framework provides guidance for assessing, monitoring, and managing AI risks throughout the operational lifecycle.
For DevOps teams, AI behavioral risk management should be integrated into continuous security testing, runtime monitoring, application configuration management, and incident response processes. Security findings should be associated with affected AI applications, model versions, agent configurations, and deployed environments whenever possible.
| Framework Reference |
Security Activity |
CI/CD Implementation |
Suggested Open-Source Tools |
| OWASP LLM01; NIST AI RMF MEASURE |
Prompt injection risk assessment |
Test and monitor AI applications for malicious instructions delivered through user prompts, retrieved documents, tool outputs, or external content. |
Promptfoo, Garak |
| OWASP LLM02; NIST AI RMF MEASURE |
Sensitive information disclosure |
Evaluate whether AI application outputs or interactions expose confidential information, credentials, or protected data. |
Microsoft Presidio, Promptfoo |
| OWASP LLM05 |
Unsafe output handling |
Test whether AI-generated outputs can trigger unauthorized commands, injection attacks, or unsafe downstream operations. |
Semgrep, OWASP ZAP |
| OWASP LLM06; NIST AI RMF MANAGE |
Excessive agency and agent permissions |
Evaluate agent permissions, tool access, and autonomous actions to prevent operations beyond approved authorization boundaries. |
Open Policy Agent, Promptfoo |
| OWASP LLM08; NIST AI RMF MEASURE |
Retrieval and vector security |
Assess unauthorized retrieval, malicious document injection, and manipulation of external information used by AI applications. |
Promptfoo, Garak |
| NIST AI RMF MEASURE, MANAGE |
Continuous AI security evaluation |
Execute repeatable adversarial evaluations and reassess AI application security following changes to models, prompts, tools, or external dependencies. |
Inspect AI, Promptfoo |
| NIST AI RMF MANAGE; NIST CSF DE.CM |
AI runtime security monitoring |
Collect application telemetry, monitor abnormal agent behavior, and correlate AI security events with supporting infrastructure activity. |
OpenTelemetry, Falco |
| NIST AI RMF MANAGE |
AI behavioral risk tracking |
Record identified weaknesses, affected AI components, mitigation decisions, and unresolved security risks. |
DefectDojo, Gitea |
OWASP identifies AI application security risk categories, while NIST AI RMF provides processes for managing AI risks. The suggested controls and tools are implementation examples rather than mandatory requirements specified by these frameworks.
AI Behavioral Risk Management - Expected Security Evidence
- AI application threat models and behavioral risk assessments.
- Prompt injection testing and evaluation results.
- Sensitive information disclosure assessments.
- Agent permission and authorization validation records.
- Security testing results for retrieval and external tool integrations.
- AI model and application evaluation reports.
- Runtime monitoring and security event records.
- Documented AI behavioral weaknesses and affected applications.
- AI security risk ownership and prioritization decisions.
- Mitigation plans and security configuration changes.
- Post-mitigation security testing and validation results.
- Records of accepted, unresolved, or escalated AI security risks.
These artifacts provide evidence that AI-specific behavioral security risks are being assessed and managed throughout the operational lifecycle. Because AI behavior may vary with model versions, prompts, retrieved content, and external integrations, security evaluations should be repeated when significant changes occur.
Coordinating Software Vulnerabilities and AI Behavioral Risks
Software vulnerability management and AI behavioral risk management should operate as complementary security processes. A deployed AI application may contain vulnerable software dependencies while also exhibiting unsafe behavior caused by excessive agent permissions, prompt injection, or insecure application design.
Both categories of findings should be linked to the affected applications and deployment environments, but their detection and remediation requirements may differ.
| Security Consideration |
Software Vulnerability Management |
AI Behavioral Risk Management |
| Primary Guidance |
NIST SSDF |
OWASP LLM Top 10, NIST AI RMF |
| Security Findings |
CVEs, vulnerable dependencies, software weaknesses |
Prompt injection, excessive agency, data exposure, unsafe model interactions |
| Detection Methods |
Vulnerability intelligence, SCA, SBOM analysis, artifact scanning |
Adversarial testing, behavioral evaluation, runtime monitoring |
| Affected Assets |
Software packages, containers, frameworks, infrastructure |
Models, prompts, agents, retrieval systems, application configurations |
| Typical Corrective Actions |
Dependency upgrades, patches, configuration updates |
Access control changes, application fixes, prompt changes, additional security boundaries |
| Validation |
Rescanning, regression testing, deployment verification |
Security reevaluation, adversarial testing, policy validation |
| Evidence |
CVE records, SBOMs, patch records, deployment history |
Evaluation results, agent logs, policy changes, behavioral risk assessments |
For DevOps and platform engineering teams, maintaining a connection between these security processes improves visibility into the complete security posture of deployed AI applications.
A common application inventory, ownership model, and deployment record can help correlate findings while preserving the distinct evaluation and remediation workflows required for each risk category.
Additional Resources
3.3 - AI Agent Activity Monitoring
Monitoring autonomous AI agents for unauthorized tool execution, excessive permissions, suspicious actions, and security policy violations.
AI Agent Activity Monitoring - Phase 3: Post Deploy
Autonomous AI agents introduce security risks because they can execute actions rather than simply generate responses. Production agents may interact with APIs, access databases, execute commands, modify files, invoke external tools, and communicate with other agents. These capabilities create security concerns when agents perform unauthorized actions, exceed assigned permissions, expose sensitive information, or respond to manipulated instructions.
During Post Deploy, organizations should continuously monitor AI agent activity to detect suspicious behavior, enforce authorization boundaries, and maintain auditable records of agent operations.
This activity focuses on establishing visibility into agent identities, tool calls, permissions, execution history, and security-sensitive actions.
AI Agent Activity Monitoring
Objective: Ensure autonomous AI agent activity is observable, attributable, and auditable, with controls capable of detecting unauthorized actions, excessive permissions, and security policy violations.
The NIST AI Risk Management Framework provides guidance for monitoring and managing AI-related risks throughout system operation.
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 establishes practices for monitoring systems, detecting suspicious activity, and managing access-related security risks.
The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications identifies excessive agency as a security risk when AI systems have unnecessary functionality, permissions, or autonomy.
For DevOps teams, autonomous agents should be monitored similarly to other privileged automated services, with additional visibility into model-directed tool selection and execution.
Security controls should record which agent initiated an action, what resource was accessed, which tool was invoked, and whether the action was authorized.
Agent-generated explanations should not replace independent audit logs, access control records, and execution telemetry.
| Framework Reference |
Security Activity |
CI/CD Implementation |
Suggested Open-Source Tools |
| NIST AI RMF MEASURE, MANAGE |
Agent activity observability |
Collect traces and events associated with agent execution, model requests, and external tool interactions. |
OpenTelemetry, Jaeger |
| NIST CSF PR.AA; OWASP LLM06 |
Agent identity and access monitoring |
Monitor authentication, authorization decisions, and access to protected resources. |
Keycloak, Open Policy Agent |
| OWASP LLM06 |
Agent tool execution monitoring |
Record tool calls and identify unauthorized commands, API operations, or unexpected resource modifications. |
OpenTelemetry, Falco |
| OWASP LLM01, LLM06 |
Agent instruction manipulation detection |
Investigate suspicious agent actions associated with untrusted inputs, retrieved content, or manipulated instructions. |
Promptfoo, Garak |
| NIST CSF DE.CM |
Suspicious process execution detection |
Monitor agent workloads for unexpected process execution, privilege escalation, and system activity. |
Falco, Tetragon |
| NIST CSF PR.AA |
Agent authorization policy enforcement |
Evaluate permissions independently of AI-generated instructions and deny unauthorized operations. |
Open Policy Agent, Casbin |
| NIST CSF DE.AE |
Agent activity correlation |
Correlate agent execution records with application logs, authentication events, and infrastructure security findings. |
OpenSearch, Wazuh |
| NIST CSF RS.MI |
Agent containment |
Support suspension of compromised agent workloads and revocation of affected credentials. |
Kubernetes, Keycloak |
| NIST AI RMF MANAGE |
Agent activity auditing |
Retain records of security-sensitive actions, tool execution results, and authorization decisions for investigation. |
OpenTelemetry, OpenSearch |
Agent observability and authorization are separate controls. Monitoring records what an agent attempted or performed, while trusted authorization systems must independently determine which actions are permitted.
Expected Security Evidence
- Inventory of active AI agents and assigned identities.
- Agent authentication and authorization records.
- Agent tool invocation and execution logs.
- Records of access to protected APIs and services.
- Alerts identifying unauthorized or suspicious agent actions.
- Agent permission and policy enforcement results.
- Runtime process execution and infrastructure security events.
- Correlated agent activity and application security records.
- Records of suspended agents and revoked credentials.
- Security investigation and remediation records.
- Audit trails linking agent actions to initiating requests and execution contexts.
These artifacts demonstrate that autonomous AI agents operate under monitored and enforceable security controls.
Agent monitoring should support timely investigation of unauthorized operations while retaining sufficient evidence to establish which actions occurred and what systems were affected.
Additional Resources
3.4 - AI-Assisted Vulnerability Remediation
Using AI to analyze vulnerabilities, recommend dependency upgrades, generate validated remediation changes, and support secure CI/CD remediation workflows.
AI-Assisted Vulnerability Remediation - Phase 3: Post Deploy
Traditional vulnerability management tools identify vulnerable software packages and report security findings, but correcting those vulnerabilities frequently requires manual investigation, dependency analysis, code modifications, compatibility testing, and deployment coordination.
AI-assisted remediation introduces opportunities to reduce this effort by analyzing vulnerability information, identifying candidate fixes, and generating proposed software changes.
However, AI-generated remediation may introduce breaking changes, dependency conflicts, functional regressions, or new vulnerabilities.
During Post Deploy, organizations should integrate AI-assisted remediation into controlled CI/CD workflows that independently validate proposed changes before they are accepted or deployed.
This activity focuses on connecting deployed vulnerability detection with AI-assisted analysis, remediation preparation, automated validation, and authorized software delivery.
Objective: Accelerate vulnerability remediation through AI-assisted analysis and code generation while ensuring that proposed fixes are independently tested, reviewed, and authorized before deployment.
The NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) establishes practices for identifying and addressing vulnerabilities in released software.
The NIST AI SSDF Profile (SP 800-218A) extends secure development guidance to AI-related systems and development practices.
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 provides guidance for managing cybersecurity risks and implementing appropriate corrective actions.
For DevOps teams, AI-assisted remediation should begin with an identified vulnerability and sufficient information about affected software components, dependency relationships, and deployment environments.
AI may analyze the vulnerability and prepare candidate updates, but independent tools and authorized reviewers should determine whether the proposed changes are acceptable.
Remediation workflows should not allow AI agents to bypass testing, change approval, or production deployment controls.
| Framework Reference |
Security Activity |
CI/CD Implementation |
Suggested Open-Source Tools |
| NIST SSDF RV.1 |
Vulnerability identification |
Detect newly disclosed vulnerabilities affecting application packages and deployed software components. |
OSV, Trivy |
| NIST SSDF RV.1; NIST CSF ID.RA |
Affected deployment identification |
Correlate vulnerable packages with application artifacts and deployment records to identify affected environments. |
Ortelius, GUAC |
| NIST SSDF RV.2 |
AI-assisted remediation analysis |
Provide vulnerability details and dependency information to an approved AI workflow for candidate remediation analysis. |
Aider, OpenHands |
| NIST SSDF RV.2 |
Dependency upgrade preparation |
Identify candidate patched versions and prepare dependency manifest or source code changes for review. |
Renovate, Aider |
| NIST SSDF PW.7, PW.8 |
Independent remediation validation |
Validate proposed fixes through builds, automated tests, static analysis, and dependency vulnerability scanning. |
Jenkins, Semgrep, Trivy |
| NIST SSDF RV.2 |
Unsafe remediation detection |
Block proposed changes that introduce failing tests, incompatible dependencies, or unacceptable security risks. |
Jenkins, Open Policy Agent |
| NIST SSDF RV.2 |
Unresolved vulnerability tracking |
Generate tracked issues when no compatible remediation is available or further investigation is required. |
Gitea, DefectDojo |
| NIST SSDF PO.1, PW.7 |
Remediation authorization |
Require appropriate review and approval before AI-generated remediation changes are merged or released. |
Gitea, Open Policy Agent |
| NIST SSDF RV.2 |
Post-deployment remediation verification |
Rescan affected components and verify that corrected versions are deployed to the intended environments. |
Trivy, Ortelius |
| NIST SSDF RV.3 |
Remediation effectiveness analysis |
Record root causes, validation outcomes, and lessons learned to improve future vulnerability prevention and remediation. |
DefectDojo, Gitea |
The listed AI development tools can assist with code changes, but they do not independently provide a complete vulnerability remediation system. Organizations must integrate vulnerability intelligence, dependency analysis, testing, authorization, and deployment verification.
AI-assisted remediation should distinguish three possible outcomes:
1. Safe Dependency Upgrade
A vulnerability has a known patched version that is compatible with the application.
The AI proposes an update, and independent build, security, and regression tests confirm the change satisfies release requirements.
The proposed fix is submitted for review and authorization before deployment.
2. Unsafe Dependency Upgrade
A patched version is available, but upgrading introduces breaking changes, dependency conflicts, or failed tests.
The proposed change is blocked or revised. The workflow records the failure and may generate a tracked issue for further investigation.
3. Ambiguous or Unresolved Vulnerability
A vulnerability cannot be safely corrected because the available evidence is insufficient, a compatible patch does not exist, or the remediation risk is unacceptable.
The workflow preserves the vulnerability finding, documents the available alternatives, and creates an issue for human investigation.
These outcomes ensure AI-assisted remediation produces auditable decisions rather than uncontrolled changes to production software.
Expected Security Evidence
- Original vulnerability findings and identifiers.
- Records identifying affected packages, applications, and deployments.
- AI-generated vulnerability analysis and candidate remediation recommendations.
- Proposed dependency changes and source code modifications.
- Dependency compatibility analysis results.
- Build, security scanning, and regression testing results.
- Records of rejected or unsuccessful remediation attempts.
- Pull requests containing validated remediation changes.
- Issues documenting unresolved vulnerabilities.
- Human review and approval records.
- Release and deployment records for corrected software.
- Post-deployment verification showing remediation status.
- Records of AI recommendations and independent validation outcomes.
These artifacts provide evidence that AI-assisted vulnerability remediation follows controlled software development and deployment practices.
The objective is to reduce the time required to investigate and prepare vulnerability corrections without weakening security validation or production change authorization.
Additional Resources
3.5 - AI Incident Response and Recovery
Detecting, investigating, containing, and recovering from AI-related cybersecurity incidents involving models, agents, prompts, and supporting infrastructure.
AI Incident Response and Recovery - Phase 3: Post Deploy
AI-enabled applications introduce security incident scenarios that may differ from traditional application and infrastructure compromises.
Incidents can involve prompt injection, unauthorized agent execution, compromised model artifacts, manipulated retrieval content, sensitive information exposure, or abuse of external tools and services.
These incidents may affect application behavior even when the underlying software binaries remain unchanged.
During Post Deploy, organizations should extend established cybersecurity incident response procedures to include AI-specific threats, affected assets, and recovery requirements.
This activity focuses on detecting and investigating AI security incidents, containing affected systems, preserving evidence, restoring trusted configurations, and incorporating lessons learned into CI/CD security practices.
AI Incident Response and Recovery
Objective: Establish repeatable processes for detecting, investigating, containing, recovering from, and documenting AI-related security incidents while preserving reliable security evidence and preventing recurrence.
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 establishes a lifecycle approach to cybersecurity risk management, including detection, response, and recovery.
NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3 provides incident response recommendations aligned with the NIST Cybersecurity Framework.
The NIST AI Risk Management Framework provides guidance for measuring and managing risks associated with AI systems.
For DevOps teams, incident response should incorporate AI application telemetry, agent execution records, model and configuration inventories, deployment evidence, and software dependency information.
Security teams should be able to identify which AI components were involved, which actions occurred, which resources were affected, and whether the incident involved compromised software, manipulated model behavior, or unauthorized agent activity.
Recovery must restore both trusted software artifacts and approved AI configurations, permissions, models, and data sources.
| Framework Reference |
Security Activity |
CI/CD Implementation |
Suggested Open-Source Tools |
| NIST CSF DE.CM, DE.AE |
AI security incident detection |
Detect suspicious model interactions, unexpected agent execution, unauthorized access, and infrastructure security events. |
Falco, Wazuh |
| NIST CSF RS.AN |
AI incident investigation |
Correlate AI application telemetry, agent tool calls, authentication records, and infrastructure logs. |
OpenSearch, OpenTelemetry |
| NIST CSF ID.AM, RS.AN |
Affected AI asset identification |
Identify affected models, software dependencies, application releases, configurations, and deployed environments. |
Ortelius, GUAC |
| NIST CSF RS.AN |
Security evidence preservation |
Preserve relevant execution logs, security events, deployment records, and model artifact identifiers for investigation. |
OpenSearch, Velociraptor |
| NIST CSF RS.MI |
Agent and workload containment |
Isolate compromised workloads, suspend agent execution, and restrict access to affected services. |
Kubernetes, Cilium |
| NIST CSF PR.AA, RS.MI |
Credential and permission revocation |
Revoke affected identities, rotate credentials, and restrict compromised agent permissions. |
Keycloak, Open Policy Agent |
| NIST CSF RC.RP |
Trusted artifact recovery |
Restore approved application versions, container images, models, prompts, and deployment configurations. |
Argo CD, Flux |
| NIST CSF RC.RP |
Recovery validation |
Execute security and functional validation before restoring affected AI services to production. |
Jenkins, Promptfoo |
| NIST CSF RS.MA, RS.AN |
Incident coordination and tracking |
Maintain incident records, assign investigation responsibilities, and document response actions. |
DFIR-IRIS, Gitea |
| NIST CSF ID.IM |
Continuous security improvement |
Convert incident findings into development security requirements, regression tests, and updated CI/CD policies. |
Gitea, Open Policy Agent |
The listed tools support incident detection, investigation, containment, and recovery activities. They do not replace an established incident response process or guarantee identification of every AI-specific threat.
AI Incident Response Workflow
A typical AI security incident response process should include:
1. Detection and Triage
Identify suspicious AI behavior, unauthorized agent actions, sensitive information exposure, or infrastructure security events.
Determine the potential impact and initiate the appropriate incident response procedures.
2. Investigation and Impact Assessment
Collect relevant telemetry, agent execution records, model information, configuration versions, and deployment evidence.
Identify affected applications, users, services, and supporting infrastructure.
3. Containment
Restrict compromised services, suspend affected agents, revoke credentials, and prevent additional unauthorized operations.
Containment procedures should preserve evidence where practical.
4. Remediation
Correct identified vulnerabilities, remove malicious configurations or content, replace compromised artifacts, and address unauthorized access paths.
Changes should be validated through established CI/CD workflows.
5. Recovery
Restore approved model versions, prompts, agent configurations, application artifacts, and infrastructure settings.
Verify that recovered services operate within approved security boundaries before resuming normal operations.
6. Lessons Learned
Document root causes, incident impact, remediation outcomes, and opportunities to improve security controls.
Update threat models, security tests, monitoring rules, and deployment policies to reduce the likelihood of recurrence.
Expected Security Evidence
- AI security incident detection records and alerts.
- Incident classification and severity assessments.
- AI application and agent execution logs.
- Model, prompt, and agent configuration version records.
- Affected software component and deployment inventories.
- Security investigation findings and incident timelines.
- Records of contained workloads and suspended agents.
- Credential revocation and access restriction records.
- Remediation changes and associated validation results.
- Recovery procedures and approved rollback records.
- Security and functional testing results following recovery.
- Incident closure and post-incident review reports.
- Updated threat models, monitoring policies, and CI/CD security requirements.
These artifacts demonstrate that AI-related security incidents can be investigated and resolved through structured, repeatable processes.
Security incident findings should inform future development, testing, and deployment activities.
Additional Resources